Incorporating Equity in Regulatory and Benefit-Cost Analysis Using Risk Based Preferences by Scott Farrow
  1
 
Incorporating Equity in Regulatory and Benefit-Cost Analysis  









Governmental guidance for regulatory and benefit-cost analysis is targeted for applied analysts.  
Existing Federal guidance recommends sensitivity analysis in general without being specific 
regarding the implicit distributional assumptions of standard benefit-cost analysis.  
Recommendations for Federal guidance are developed to:  1) better communicate expectations 
for distributional analysis, 2) develop guidance for descriptive statistics related to distributional 
issues, and 3) integrate Government published measures of inequality aversion and to evaluate 
compensation for identified sensitive populations.  While such actions have a data collection and 
analysis cost, they may make the results of regulatory analysis more relevant by investigating 
both efficiency and equity measures. 
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1.  FEDERAL REGULATORY AND BENEFIT-COST GUIDANCE 
 
The economic and risk analysis professions both lack governing bodies that promulgate 
analytical standards.   This may be desirable in general but the practice creates a vacuum when 
governmental organizations such as the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
considers revisions to its guidelines for regulatory analysis
(1,2)   This paper considers the purpose 
and possible sources of specific guidelines and provides substantive and procedural suggestions 
for guidelines to integrate  distributional  and equity  impacts  into regulatory and benefit-cost 
analysis..  
  The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and its predecessors have issued 
guidelines for the benefit-cost and related analysis of regulations and government investments 
for decades
(1,2).  Other  parts of the Office of Management and Budget also regularly issue 
guidelines of varying complexity, such as those issued annually  for budget submissions which 
sometimes include elements of risk and economic practice
(3).  Each circular is generally issued 
under legal authority delegated by statute or an Executive Order
1.   
  The target audience for OMB guidelines is personnel in the Executive Branch and their 
consultants.  The subject is the analytical expectation for specialized products, such as regulatory 
reviews.  The personnel may practice a wide range of professions and degrees but are generally 
applied practitioners of each discipline, whatever degree they are holding.  For instance, about 2 
                                                 
1 For instance, Circular A-4 on Regulatory Analysis cites as authority “… Section 6(a)(3)(c) of Executive 
Order12866, "Regulatory Planning and Review," the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act, and a variety of related 
authorities.” 
(2)   3
percent of EPA’s personnel with advanced degrees (Master’s, J.D. or Ph.D.) were economists; 
about 16 percent in the life sciences, 3 percent health professionals, and so on
(4).  As Lave
(5) has 
well articulated, benefit-cost analysis in practice may fall significantly short of its capability in 
an ideal setting.  Not only are there conceptual difficulties for even the most advanced analysis 
but at least time, budget, strategic pressures and training limitations in practice affect the product 
produced.   Consequently, the guidelines appear designed to communicate “standard” practice to 
be implemented by government analysts and consultants rather than “frontier” practice as might 
be implemented by researchers implementing new approaches, although some advanced 
practices are mentioned.  In that context, advanced approaches to distribution such as proposed 
by Adler
(6) or Zerbe
(7) may be more appropriately the subject of academic development than the 
content of standard guidelines for practice. 
The guidelines can provide criteria for Executive Office review either by OMB or by 
other parties.  OMB review is a standard part of agency regulatory procedures
(8).  In addition, the 
U.S. Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) considers OMB guidelines as sources of 
criteria by which to review agency products; and academic or think tank analysts also use the 
guidelines as review criteria
(9-11).  However, the guidelines do not appear to create a source of 
judicial review although they mix guidance on implementation of Executive Orders, which is 
crafted so as not to create a basis for judicial review, with guidance on statutory requirements 
which have varying exposure to judicial review
(8).   In some professional organizations there is a 
clearly specified hierarchy of sources of guidance.  For instance, the Governmental guidelines 
under discussion, and the professional literature from which it is drawn, are included in the 
lowest level of acceptable sources for guidance in the accounting profession 
(12).   
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2.  GUIDANCE ON DESCRIPTIVE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS 
 
Providing guidance on distributional issues could be focused on three steps: 1)  enforcing 
distributional  impacts as more central to  the process, 2) identifying typical types of descriptive 
distributional statistics, and 3) identifying typical welfare adjustments or distributional test.  Each 
is discussed in turn. 
 
2.1 Communicating Distributional Impact Expectations 
 
Currently, distributional analysis is  described  relatively well in initial  portions of 
regulatory guidance where it is stated:  
“Those who bear the costs of a regulation and those who enjoy its 
benefits often are not the same people. The term “distributional effect” refers 
to the impact of a regulatory action across the population and economy, 
divided up in various ways (e.g., income groups, race, sex, industrial sector, 
geography). …. 
Your regulatory analysis should provide a separate description of 
distributional effects (i.e., how both benefits and costs are distributed among 
sub-populations of particular concern) so that decision makers can properly 
consider them along with the effects on economic efficiency. Executive Order 
12866 authorizes this approach. Where distributive effects are thought to be 
important, the effects of various regulatory alternatives should be described   5
quantitatively to the extent possible, including the magnitude, likelihood, and 




Substantial research has indicated that many agencies do not as yet regularly comply with the 
basic requirements for regulatory and benefit-cost analysis as defined by OMB guidance and the 
distributional guidance appears to be one of the less studied features
(9-11).  However, the Director 
of OIRA in 2009 appears favorable to considering distributional issues as he stated with regard 
to regulation:  
“Suppose that in terms of overall welfare, the regulation is not desirable; it 
makes aggregate welfare lower rather than higher.  But suppose, too, that 
those who benefit are less advantaged than those who lose (and) ….suppose 
that the redistribution is not going to happen through the tax system.  If so, 




Whether or not redistribution can occur more effectively, or at all, through the tax code or 
another mechanism gets  at the core of some economist’s concern with investigating equity 
through benefit-cost analysis.  Projects may be inefficient means of transferring income such that 
it would be better to increase the over-all “pie” and then redistribute it although such approaches 
may ignore the behavioral immediacy of project impacts and the feasibility of adjusting the tax 
code 
(14).    6
Although OMB has to date avoided a public checklist of required elements of a 
regulatory analysis, such a checklist or other means of communicating the importance of 
distributional issues seems appropriate, leading to a recommendation that OMB should develop a 
communication method to consistently expect data or discussion on the distributional impacts of 
a regulation as requested in existing guidance. 
 
2.2 Identifying Acceptable Distributional Statistics 
 
Although substantive guidance exists for many elements of regulatory and benefit-cost 
analysis, additional detail is desirable but lacking for the analysis of distributional impacts.  
There is very little guidance from OMB on data analysis related to distribution, either as its own 
subject or where it might be integrated with the benefit-cost analysis.  In other areas of 
economics however, there are extensive discussions of descriptive statistics and of normative 
measures related to distribution
(15-17).   
Additional guidance should exist on typical measures of distributional information.  
Distributional data may be relevant on a wide range of sub-groups of potential interest identified 
in legislation, executive orders or other sources based on criteria such as income, poverty, race, 
gender, ethnicity, location, health status, age and so on. However,  guidance may more 
appropriately  be  targeted at  acceptable or preferred  measures  irrespective of their particular 
application.  Numerous options exist for quantifying distributional measures  in a benefit-cost 
analysis, among them: 
•  Tableaus of impacts on economic actors  such as the decomposition of surplus 
measures   7
•  Frequency or cumulative distribution plots 
•  Quantile measures 
•  Variance 
•  Coefficient of variation (s/µ) 
•  Lorenz curves--ordered quantiles of the population with quantiles of the variable 
of interest, such as income 
•  Gini coefficients--derived from Lorenz curve information, range 0 to 1 
•  Atkinson index of inequality--based  on  measure related to income  inequality 
aversion, range 0 to 1 
 
The first item, impacts on economic actors from decompositions of welfare effects, is 
well established in textbook expositions
(18-20) and in the literature
(21,22).  OMB briefly identifies 
some elements of distributional tableaus under “other benefits and costs” such as consumer and 
producer surplus
(2).  A benefit of  analyzing distributional effects on consumers, producers, 
government and externally affected parties is that the categories are generally consistent with the 
welfare economic of the analysis; a cost is that those specific categories may not represent the 
sub-groups of interest in any particular project or government redistribution objective.  As with 
all analysis, implementation takes data and time. 
Other statistical measures of variation  as listed above have been used in the study of 
inequality, especially that of income
(15).  There is some overlap with  communicating   
distributions of risk information about which Krupnick, et al.
(23)  have investigated the responses 
of some decision-makers.  The U.S. Census Bureau has long reported various measures of 
inequality in income in the U.S. including the summary measures of the Gini, Theil, and   8
Atkinson measures several of which are reported in Table 1 for 2007
(24,25).    The Lorenz curve 
for the United States for 2007 is also graphable from Census data as in Figure 1. 
The development of the Atkinson measure
(26) is discussed in more detail below as it is the 
basis for an implementable weighting of distributional impacts.  Suffice it here to interpret a 
value from Table 1, such as .095 for the Atkinson measure with e equal to .25 in column 1.  This 
indicates a degree of inequality aversion such that at most 9.5% of money income could be given 
up in exchange for an equal income while holding utility constant.     
 
Figure 1:  US Lorenz Curve for 2007 and Gini Coefficient Definition 
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Table I:  Summary inequality statistics reported by U.S. Census Bureau 
Measures of Distribution 
 
2007 















Gini index of income inequality 
 












Date:  (24). 
 
The existence of inequality data published regularly by a part of the U.S. Government leads to 
two recommendations:  1) OMB should meet with the U.S. Census Bureau and an interagency 
statistical and economic group to provide guidance on methods and measures for the quantitative 
analysis and visual display of distributional measures, and OMB should report the status quo 
(baseline) estimates of its preferred measures periodically using nationwide data as a benchmark 
for analyses. 
 
3. LINKING DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 
 
Regulatory and benefit-cost analyses seek  to answer when a governmental action will make 
society better off with  a  regulation or  project than without.  Despite  long effort, this is 
understood to be a normative and not a positive question.  The foundation and standard practice   10
in benefit-cost analysis  is to count each dollar equally no matter who receives or pays that 
dollar
(1,2,19,20).   It is well understood that benefit-cost analysis using these equal weights and the 
Kaldor-Hicks  potential compensation criteria  answers the  societal question  only with the 
unrealistically stringent assumption that the marginal social utility of income for all members is 
equal
(27).    It is here that economist’s stated aversion to mixing efficiency with equity when 
doing benefit-cost analysis removes the profession from what is arguably the central topic of 
policy debate, the distributional impacts of governmental actions.   What quantitative measures 
can link distributional impacts with the welfare underpinnings of benefit-cost analysis?  Two 
lines of thought are investigated, that of sub-group Pareto improvement, and that of sensitivity to 
distributional weights. 
 
3.1 Actual Compensation: Pareto Improvement 
  If all those who bear costs from a government action were compensated sufficiently to 
achieve  at least their original utility and some residual remained;  there would  likely be 
acceptance that society would be better off with the action than without.  Such compensation is 
generally ruled out due to high transaction costs when costs are spread widely.  However, much 
legislation and data collection is based on sub-groups of concern, for instance:  those in poverty, 
racial and ethnic minorities, age cohorts (children, the elderly), gender, spatially distinct regions, 
and so on.  For instance,  Executive Order 12898  on Environmental Justice focuses on  the 
importance of assessing impacts on  minority and low income populations
(28).  Farrow
(29) 
recommended  that sub-groups  identified as sensitive populations in the regulatory process   11
receive actual instead of hypothetical compensation
2.  As a group, at least indifference or Pareto 
improvement (each group being at least as well off as prior to the action) would occur. In a 
benefit-cost analysis, the compensation would be a transfer and not affect the net benefits 
although real resources used in the transfer would add costs to the action. 
In a similar vein, Graham
(30) suggests that a test be included for those below the poverty 
line.  Adler
(31) defines such measures social gradients for which there may be various difficulties 
with bright lines (those just above and those just below) and within-group equity.  At the same 
time, identifying sub-groups and considering actual compensation is responsive to the type of 
distributional criteria that tends to be identified in legislation. 
The potential for guidance on actual compensation leads to a recommendation that OMB 
should consult with the Department of Justice and convene a multi-disciplinary advisory panel to 
review  whether  a reasonable reading of  legislation  and executive orders  has  identified  sub-
populations where the intent is not to make that group worse off as a result of Government 
actions.  If any such groups are found, OMB should request the estimated cost in regulatory 
analyses to include compensation to the identified sub-groups. 
 
 
                                                 
2 For context, this recommendation was the result of participation in a benefit-cost analysis for a 
developing world project.  The project was forecast to meet standard benefit-cost criteria when 
distribution was ignored but regional and occupational sub-groups of the population would bear 
a substantial portion of the cost.  The project plans included compensation to restore the prior 
level of utility but distribution was an important issue in the region as significant economic and 
political unrest accompanied projects nearby.   
   12
3. Distributional Weighting 
 
Several of the descriptive distributional statistics have a welfare basis that can be linked 
to benefit-cost analysis.  For instance, the edited volume by Cowell
(15) contains a section of eight 
“classic” articles on inequality that take an explicit welfare theoretic approach and include 
authors such as Rothschild, Stiglitz, Atkinson, Kolm, Meade and others.  In textbook formats, 
much of these discussions are summarized as the use of distributional weights that might be 
placed on outcomes for various groups from a project
(19).  Importantly, the conceptual 
development of welfare based inequality measures is symmetric to and owes a large debt to 
measures of  risk.  This may be clearest in the work of Atkinson
(26,31)  and Rothchild and 
Stiglitz
(15).  In particular, it was noted that when outcomes are dispersed and marginal utilities 
decline for larger values, then there is symmetry between risk aversion and inequality aversion 
whether over income or other variables.   
Atkinson
(15)  noted the parallel mathematical structure between the welfare based 
modeling of risk and the welfare based modeling  of inequality.  He defined  the “equally 
distributed equivalent income” symmetrically with the certainty equivalent in the risk literature 
and defined an inequality measure, I(e),  based on the ratio of the certainty equivalent income 









As with measures of risk aversion, a key component in Atkinson’s measure is the 
functional form of the social utility function and its parameter(s).   A  power or CRRA (constant   13
relative risk aversion) functional form in risk depends on one parameter, e; social welfare 
functions for inequality aversion follow analogous development
(32).  The parameter e measures 
the degree of inequality aversion and is interpreted as the elasticity of marginal utility with 
respect to income.  The central “equity” result of these forms is that movements toward a more 
equal distribution increase welfare if e differs from 0, the current default in benefit-cost analysis. 
  The link between these power forms and social marginal utility weighting can be 
straightforward.  Consider that the default distributional assumption in benefit-cost analysis is 
that the marginal utility of income, U’(y), is a constant, ?, across all individuals and groups, 
alternatively U’(y)=?y
0.  Inequality aversion can be based on diminishing social marginal utility 
of any factor, but let it remain income for now such that U’(y,e) = ?y
-e.   Here e is interpreted as 
the elasticity of marginal social welfare with respect to income of group i.  Given this 
specification of marginal utility, one can integrate to the utility function itself which yields the 
power functional form; or more directly, use weights in benefit-cost analysis that depend on the 




























If e, the inequality aversion parameter is zero then the standard assumption applies of equal 
impact or no inequality aversion. Let that remain the default assumption for regulatory analysis.  
But consider that sensitivity analysis is almost universally identified as good practice
(2,19) and so 
alternative distributional weights can and should be investigated.   Review articles exist on the 
values of e, the inequality aversion parameter
(33,34).  The U.S. Bureau of the Census regularly 
reports measures based on values of .25, .5, and .75 for e
(24,25).  The Government of the United 
Kingdom
(35) uses in its illustration of weighting for benefit-cost analysis a value of e equal to 1,   14
implying a marginal utility as simple as 1/y.  Table 2 uses these governmentally identified values 
of e to estimate weights for the median and quintiles of the U.S. household income distribution 
for 2007.  The ratio of weights for the lowest quintile compared to the highest quintile increases 
from 1:1 for the standard assumption when e equal zero,  to 2:1 for e equal to .25, and then up to 
7.5:1 for e equal to .75, the highest value used by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 




Mean US HH 
Income by Quintile: 
2007
Default: 
e=0 e=.25  e=.5 e=.75 e=1
0-20 $11,551 1 1.4 2.1 3.0 4.3
20-40 $29,442 1 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7
Median $50,233 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
40-60 $49,968 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
60-80 $79,111 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6
80-100 $167,971 1 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3  
Data source: (25,35) 
 
As OMB guidance
(2)  recommends both sensitivity analysis and the use of certainty 
equivalents for the analysis of risk,  it seems appropriate to consider parallel  analysis  for 
distributional impacts based on a parallel structure to risk aversion.   Consequently, a final 
recommendation is that OMB should convene a multi-disciplinary advisory group to provide 
advice on methods to apply sensitivity analysis to the standard equal marginal utility of income 
assumption.  Further, OMB may consider, as it has for the discount rate, several “anchoring” 
values for sensitivity tests perhaps using an inequality aversion parameter and values published 
by the U.S. Census.   15
4. CONCLUSION 
   
Guidance for benefit-cost analysis is targeted at implementation by applied analysts.  Existing 
guidance recommends sensitivity analysis in general without providing substantive discussions 
of how that might be implemented with respect to the implicit distributional assumptions of 
standard benefit-cost analysis.  After consideration of existing guidance documents and 
implementable alternatives in the literature, recommendations are targeted at:  1)  better 
communication regarding Governmental expectations for distributional analysis, 2) developing 
guidance for descriptive statistics related to distributional issues, and 3) investigating the 
sensitivity of the standard regulatory and benefit-cost results to Government published measures 
of inequality aversion or to actual compensation for identified sub-groups.  While such actions 
have a data collection and analysis cost, they may make the results of benefit-cost analysis more 
relevant by informing both efficiency and equity issues.  16
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